We discovered that the distribution of dividends in Korean horse races follows a power law. A simple model of betting is proposed, which reproduces the observed distribution. The model provides a mechanism to arrive at the true underlying winning probabilities, which are initially unknown, in a selforganized collective fashion, through the dynamic process of betting.
]
During the past decade, power law distributions were discovered in a wide variety of phenomena. Quantitative analysis has been performed on distributions observed in diverse areas, such as sh school size 1], heart dynamics 2], frequency of jams in Internet tra c 3], size of war 4], scaling in currency exchange 5, 6] and stock market price changes 7, 8] , just to cite from a random selection of disciplines.
In the physical sciences, power law scaling is usually associated with critical behavior or with scale free growth processes. A mechanism producing power law distributions has been found also in the study of stochastic processes involving multiplicative noise 9,10].
Since the seminal work of Bak et al 11] , it has been tempting to try to connect such power laws with self-organized-criticality (SOC). In existing models of SOC, such as sandpile, sliding-block, forest-re, evolution, etc., a dynamic process plays a central role, yielding avalanches whose sizes follow a power law frequency distribution. Elucidating general mechanisms underlying power law behaviors in biological and social sciences is a challenging task.
We present here empirical evidence for a power law distribution in a new context; that of horse racing. We also propose a simple model to explain the phenomenon. We believe that the model is relevant beyond the speci c context of horse racing, as it might explain how power law distributions emerge in social sciences, especially in a large assembly of interconnected human activities.
Although the mechanism of producing power laws is quite di erent, the problem and proposed model have several similarities with those of foreign exchange 5,6], stock market 7, 8] , and the minority game 12]: many independent agents participate, each makes decisions according to his own strategy, based on previous results. The activity results in a change of an index, such as price, exchange rate, and dividend, which is known to all.
We studied the distributions of the values of the winning dividends in horse races held from 1996 to 1999 in Korea, obtained from the database of the Korea Racing Association 13]. The dividend is determined in an interesting way in these races. Betting is open for a time interval before the race, during which people can bet on the horse of their choice. During the process of betting, n i , the total amount of money that has been bet so far on each horse i, is displayed on a board, which is updated at time steps of 30 seconds. The dividend, f i , is determined at every time step according to the simple equation
and is also displayed. Here r is a tax collected by the racing organization. Betting stops at a xed time before the race. The nal value reached by f i is the amount paid (per unit money invested) to a person who has picked the winning horse i. This kind of gambling is unique in that the dividend on each horse is determined only after the entire process of betting has been completed.
In general, a horse which is believed to have a high probability of winning, p i , yields a lower dividend than horses with little chance. Therefore it can be expected that races yielding higher dividends occur less often than those yielding lower ones, provided the bettors have reliable information on the horses.
We collected and tabulated the values of the winning dividends; we de ned bins limited by integer values of f (the rst bin for 1 < f < 2, the second for 2 < f < 3, etc.), and evaluated the frequency of occurrence of the winning dividends in each bin. We found that over a considerable range their distribution follows a power law, P (f) / f ?x ; x 1:70 (2) as shown in Fig. 1 . The value x 1:70 was obtained by a best t to the data in the range 2 f 40. We plotted here the relative frequency of occurrence for all values of f, for races with N = 12 and N = 14 horses, as well as for the sum of all races, irrespective of N. The database contains records of 1447 races with N = 14, 652 with N = 12; the number of races is considerably lower for other values of N, and hence the corresponding frequency plots are much noisier and not shown. For 8 N 14 the distribution is e ectively independent of the number of horses N. We look for models that reproduce the two main features of the empirical data: (a) that the races yielding the lowest dividends occur most frequently, and (b) the distribution has the form of a power law over a signi cant range of f values.
We assume that the basic rule that governs people's betting strategies is to pick at each moment t that horse for which the expectation value of the gain, f i p i = (1 ? r)Zp i =n i is maximal.
The simplest model we can think of assumes that there exists a xed set of probabilities p i (of horse i winning the race). Assume that these p i are accessible to everyone in the stadium and that all bettors use the same information and betting strategy. These assumptions de ne a dynamical betting process, which has a stable attractor: the state of equal constant gain for each horse, i.e., p i f i = C. It is trivial to see that this situation is indeed stable against perturbations; e.g. increasing n i =Z decreases the dividend of horse i, so that f i p i decreases and at the next time steps no bets will be placed on horse i. This simplest model therefore yields the nal dividends f i = C=p i , horse j will win the race with probability p j and the winning dividend will be f winner = C=p winner . If the winning probabilities are generated from any reasonable distribution, this simplest model fails to reproduce both aspects (a) and (b) mentioned above: the resulting dividend distribution has a peak at some intermediate f 1=p and we do not get the observed power law decay for large f. To obtain the power law distribution of dividends for larger f, we have to tune carefully the distribution from which the winning probabilities are selected for small p i . Moreover, in order to have the peak at the lowest f, in a large fraction of the races there should be a most likely winner, whose chance of winning dominates all the other horses. However, nobody, especially no horse racing organization, would tolerate such a trivial race. Usually a rule of handicap is implemented to equalize the chance of winning for all the horses; the horses with better records carry heavier burdens than others in the race. The resulting di culties of prediction are pointed out in Ref. 14] . Although several kinds of information magazines are sold at the racing stadium which summarize the details of previous races, ground conditions, weather, handicap, harmony with jockey, etc., the expectations of the di erent experts are not consistent with each other for most races. Hence one cannot assume that there exists reliable information on the winning probabilities, which is shared and used by all bettors.
Nevertheless, our main conclusion, which will be substantiated later, is that there indeed exists a most-likely winner , in spite of the handicaps, even though the information is initially known to none. To explain this claim, we have to nd out how does a large fraction of the bettors identify this likely winner in the absence of reliable information? And what kind of distribution of probability of winning for each race will yield the empirical power law distribution of dividends?
To address these questions we introduce a simple model of betting, in which people rely both on some initial naive guess and on the information displayed on the board. There might be professional gamblers equipped with accurate information; they are, however, a small minority. Most bettors are amateurs who play the races just for their leisure and fun. For them the magazines are the only available prior information, and the dividends displayed on the board a ect their decision considerably, since they re ect the information available to all other people, including the professionals. It is natural for this large majority of amateurs to regard the horse with the highest n i as the best.
We therefore assume that initially people bet only on the basis of some naive expectations, based on the magazines etc. We denote this initial naive guess of the probability that horse i will win by p (0) i . For simplicity, betting is assumed to occur sequentially and with the same amount of money at each time step. Further, we assume that after every bet, the board is immediately updated. The following betting dynamics is assumed and investigated: At time t, the bettor views the information displayed on the board (f i (t)'s or, equivalently n i (t)'s). The bettor uses this information to update his current estimates for the probabilities of winning,
and places his bet on horse j, for which (at that time) the expected gain is maximal: n i (t + 1) = n i (t) + i;j ; where j is max i f i (t)P i (t):
The dividends are updated on the board and at the next time step people bet using the modi ed probabilities and dividends, and so on. Due to the tax, the maximal gain may correspond to a dividend which is lower than unity. In such cases we add a restriction that moves the bet to the next sized gain. The results with and without this restriction do not yield noticeable di erence in numerical simulations 15]. This process converges to a set of winning probabilities P i ; the nal assumption we take is that these are the true probabilities, according to which the winner is selected.
It is important to state that in all but a single special case simulations of the dynamic process described above converged to sets of P i and f i such that P i f i = const., irrespectively of the models F and distributions of the initial probabilities that were used. However, nding a model which leads to the observed distribution of winning dividends is not an easy task.
The dynamic process described above is completely deterministic. The only stochastic components are that of initialization, i.e. when the initial probabilities p (0) i are drawn from some distribution Q(p (0) ), and the nal step of selecting the winning horse according to the nal probabilities P i . The distribution of winning dividends is determined by these probabilities and is independent of the dynamic process that generated them
We are left with the freedom of choosing a) the distribution Q of the initial p (0) i and b) the model F , see Eq. (3), used to update the probabilities. There are many plausible choices for Q. We do not know how the horse racing organization arranges the list of horses in each race from a pool of hundreds of horses; presumably the organizer himself does not have any idea of the probability distribution of winning. We hope to nd a model which converges in a self-organized way (i.e. through the betting dynamics, regardless of the distribution of initial probabilities), to a set of P i which reproduce the observed power law distribution of winning dividends.
Numerical simulations. Our simulations were done for N = 12 and 14 horses in each race. The value r = 0:2 was used for the tax. For each race we rst generated a set of initial winning probabilities in the following way. A set of N random independent numbers x i were generated from a Normal distribution. The initial probabilities were determined by p (0) i = jx i j= P i jx i j. Hereafter we will refer to this as the primitive distribution.
Additive correction We analyzed various forms of the function F p (0) i ; n i =Z]. We rst tried an additive correction of the initial probability,
where is a parameter that controls the weight given to the correction due to the updated dividends; g(x) is an increasing function of x. We tried the form g(x) = x ; (6) and investigated three cases: = 1, > 1, and < 1. When = 1, the expected gain at time t is given by 
In the dynamics generated by this function the object to be maximized by the bettor depends only on f i p (0) i , just as in the simplest model considered above, without corrections. Indeed we nd convergence at long times to the same nal state, with p (0) i =n i const. Simulations with = 1 and the primitive initial distribution for N = 12; 14 horses yield dividend distributions that di er from the empirical observation 15]; a pronounced maximum is observed at f 5. On this basis we can rule out the additive model with = 1.
For the case > 1 we found two regimes in our simulations. For > 0:8 we found that after some transient always one horse dominates the betting; as n i =Z increases, the increase of P i dominates the decrease of f i and hence its expected gain increases. All people bet on the same horse: this situation does not lead to the observed distribution of dividends.
For smaller values of , increased betting on a horse decreases its expected gain, and the nal n i =Z are again distributed so as to equalize the values f i P i . Our simulations with 0:0 0:6 yielded results in qualitative agreement with the previous case, of = 1. In the intermediate region of , the races fall into one of two classes: one won by the horse with the dominant bets, i.e., f 1, and the second, won by other horses. The distribution of dividends for the second class becomes noisier and noisier as grows. and nally for > 0:8 it becomes discontinuous. we are left with the rst class. For the last possibility, < 1, the gain f i P i is a monotonically decreasing function of n i . For increasing the values of the n i 's become more and more uniform, tending to n i 1=N, and the corresponding distribution of dividends narrows, until at = 1 it reaches a delta function with all dividends taking the value (1 ? r)N.
We thus conclude that the additive rule (5) with the simple form (6) for g does not produce the observed distribution of the winning dividends.
We now turn to a multiplicative rule, of the form (8) again with g(x) = x . It is easy to show that should be less than unity; otherwise the horse with the initially maximal winning probability takes all the bets. Therefore we limited our simulations to 0 1.
We found that for = 0 the distribution of winning dividends does not peak in the lowest interval. The frequency of the lowest dividend increases with . The best ts to the observed data were obtained using c = 0:63 and 0:65, respectively. The results of our simulations, performed for these values of are presented in Fig. 2 (9) This is an interesting result; it means that in the course of the betting dynamics, the probability of winning evolves in a way that enhances di erences: the winning probabilities of initially better horses are much more increased and those of initially worse horses become even more suppressed. Thus, in the nal states, there indeed exists a most-likely winner whose probability of winning dominates those of all the other horses, giving rise to the observed maximum at the lowest bin of dividends.
To test the extent to which our results depend on the distribution of initial winning probabilities, we replaced the Normal distribution for the x i (from which the p (0) i = x i = P x i are constructed), by a uniform distribution 0 x i 1. Simulations with this distribution and the multiplicative rule again yielded the observed distribution of dividends.
Detailed simulations with various initial distributions will be given elsewhere 15]. In general, the value of c increases as the variance among the initial probabilities decreases. For bounded distributions, such as the uniform one, the best ts were found near c = 0:9.
We summarize and discuss the few assumptions that were made by our simple model of horse racing: (i) The board of dividends is updated on-line and all bets are for the same amount. In fact betting is open for 30 minutes, during which the board is updated 60. The possible e ects of having a nite number of updates, at discrete intervals, will be presented elsewhere 15]. (ii) All bettors are rational and use the same optimal strategy. We did not allow any noise in the decision, such as may be introduced by random bettors. (iii) All the bettors use the same initial guess for the winning probabilities.
We have reasons to believe that the amplifying mechanism described above, which is generated by the betting process, will reduce the e ect of allowing noise into the initial guess. Nevertheless, an improved model should consider the e ects of both kinds of \noise". This is the strongest assumption.
There is an interesting analogy between this model and one of stock markets, in which traders are divided into the two classes, rational and noisy 16]. We may also classify people into professionals who come with prior knowledge and amateurs, who use only the information on the board. It is important to note that the role of amateur is di erent from that of a noisy trader in stock market models; here the true probability of winning is determined through the decision of all the people, so that professionals alone cannot apply an optimal strategy.
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